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THE CHALLENGES OF COMMAND AND CONTROL IN 2010
COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Maritime Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract of

**THE CHALLENGES OF COMMAND AND CONTROL IN 2010
COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS**

Robust information operations through successful detection and monitoring of production, trafficking from production source to user, and infrastructure support for illegal drug supply activities must be sustained in order to achieve effective interdiction operations. This paper introduces many new technologies on the horizon of the 21st Century that will vastly improve information and interdiction operations. From these, future operational commanders will be provided an extensive set of options in order to rapidly attack or interdict key nodes of the drug cartels' operations. In order to accommodate the speed of illegal drug supply operations that will be realized in the new millennium, the current C2 structure should be *immediately* reviewed and subsequently changed. This paper recommends that the leadership, organizational staffing, missions, and rules of engagement are four critical areas that should receive primary re-structuring.

"Technology alone will not solve the problem, nor will personnel, but a synergy between the two is a powerful weapon to counter drug trafficking organizations."

— Joint Pub 3-07.4 (Joint Counterdrug Operations), page IV-35

Introduction:

"...Houston, We Have a Problem"

Robust information operations through successful detection and monitoring of production, trafficking from production source to user, and infrastructure support for illegal drug supply activities must be sustained in order to achieve effective interdiction operations. In accomplishing this, our nation's counterdrug (CD) strategy adopted over the past few years by the Office of National Drug Control Policy [ONDCP] has realized some successes. Nevertheless, as with any strategy, it must be continually evaluated and adapted as necessary in order to meet the challenges of our dynamic environment. Over the next ten years, vastly improved information operations will provide future operational commanders (or leaders) an extensive set of options in order to rapidly attack or interdict "enemy centers of gravity" -- critical nodes of the drug cartels's operations. Given the current command structure, coordination and control arrangements may be too slow to accommodate the 2010 tempo of operations. Ten years from now, who should ultimately be in charge of the counterdrug operations for supply and demand reduction? How will the future commanders (in the Department of Defense [DOD] and other agencies) exercise command and control [C2] of their available options in the next generation of counterdrug operations? Are there seams and/or will seams be created/exploited by drug traffickers? Essentially, does the current C2 structure effectively address the future, preparing organizations and their leadership to do the counterdrug work for the United States that is required in the next century? It is the thesis of this paper that it does

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not..."Houston, we have a problem." The current C2 structure should be reviewed and subsequently changed *now* in order to accommodate the speed of information operations that will be realized in the new millennium.

Although I (as do many others) firmly believe that, over the long term, demand reduction is ultimately the key to reducing drug use in America as well as internationally¹, the supply reduction requirement remains critical to the overall counterdrug strategy. It is not the intention of this document to discuss demand reduction in any detail, enter the debate over the military's role in counterdrug efforts or "throw large stones" at the ONDCP. Rather, as deducted from the thesis, the purpose of this paper is to recommend some operational command and control possibilities for future illegal drug supply reduction operations.

In arriving at this paper's thesis, two important assertions were made: first, there is a dangerous drug problem in America and second, there has been some good work done in reducing the same. In the following sections, these assertions will be substantiated. Once completed, the current supply reduction system (including DOD's critical roles) will be examined, describing information, interdiction, and C2 operations. Next, an introduction to future information and interdiction systems will be provided. Counter arguments will then be offered and evaluated. Finally, recommended 2010 C2 of drug supply reduction operations will be discussed, providing some thoughts on organizational structure considerations, C2 relationships, future missions, and rules of engagement challenges.

**The First Assertion:
The Drug Abuse Situation in the United States and Beyond**

The United States faces a serious threat from the persistent and, by some indicators, increasing illegal drug conditions. Today, drug use by America's youth is at an all-time high (but, at least, stabilizing); crime, violence, and drugs are proven to be inter-linked, and our health care system is in danger of being overburdened in treating victims of drug use and addiction.² Each year, Americans spend about \$50 billion buying illegal drugs and our governments (local, state, and federal) collectively spend \$30 billion in supply and demand reduction efforts and drug-related problems. In total, illegal drugs cost our society approximately \$67 billion each year.³ Annually, there are some 14,000 drug-related deaths of US citizens⁴, not including hundreds of thousands of babies exposed to illicit drugs prior to their birth. Looking to the future, there are many dangers in giving the problem a chance to grow. An increasing number of third world nations affected by the economic and political influence of drug traffickers demonstrate the results of uncontained illegal drug expansionism. Often, these drug source and transit zone countries require the continuation of the illegal drug trade in order to keep their economies solvent; at present, many are inescapably dependent on illegal drug trade. For example, in our hemisphere, the Cali Mafia was, for a long time, a predominant drug producing organization (primarily cocaine) from Columbia, South America. The Mexican Federation, another large producer of illegal drugs (primarily marijuana), resides just south of our international border.⁵ Both of these organizations indirectly - sometimes, directly - fund(ed) their governments (with "dirty money") in return for passivity in the enforcement of their domestic counterdrug laws.⁶ In these countries, democracy has been

undermined, justice thwarted, bribery and corruption now abound, criminal violence is rampant, and public confidence in elected and appointed officials has been weakened. Many of these similar trends are now appearing in varying degrees in the United States.⁷ The central problem remains that if the drug cartels are, by any measure, only minimally successful, they will stay in business.⁸ Our last three presidents, backed by Congress with legislative and financial support, have recognized the severity of the problem (as supported by these startling facts), resulting in them stating that America's drug problem is a threat to our national security.

**The Second Assertion:
The Current Strategy -- Aggressive Goals Achieve Some Success**

In order to counter the complex drug threat to the United States, an encompassing National Drug Control Strategy was produced in 1988. It is updated annually by the President and submitted to Congress for their review. For the past two years, the strategy has effectively identified five goals.

- (1) Educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol and tobacco.
- (2) Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence.
- (3) Reduce health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use.
- (4) Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.
- (5) Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.⁹

Of these goals, the first and third focus on demand reduction whereas the second, fourth, and fifth focus on supply reduction. In working to achieve these, there is no room for complacency; many national and international drug policy challenges remain. GEN Barry McCaffrey, Director, ONDCP, lists the most critical of these as preventing our sixty-eight million Americans under eighteen from becoming a new generation of addicts; it is unacceptable that drug use rates have doubled among our youth since 1992.¹⁰

The National Drug Control Strategy, 1998 -- A Ten Year Plan lists four essential drug control performance measures (of effectiveness). They include:

- (1) Reduce the availability of illicit drugs in the United States by 25% by 2002.
- (2) Reduce the availability of illicit drugs in the United States by 50% by 2007.
- (3) Reduce the demand for illicit drugs in the United States by 25% by 2002.
- (4) Reduce the demand for illicit drugs in the United States by 50% by 2007. ¹¹

Although some success has been achieved toward accomplishing these goals, much more work still needs to be done. GEN Charles E. Wilhelm, CINCSOUTH, in his testimony before Congress in March of 1998 reported,

"Though we have enjoyed some success in reducing production in the source zone, and interdiction efforts have led to the interception of appreciable quantities of illegal drugs destined for the United States, supply continues to match demand and we still see a number of challenges before us." ¹²

**Current Information and Interdiction Operations for
Illegal Drug Supply Reduction:
"The Great Melting Pot"**

Many domestic and international organizations participate and have responsibilities in reducing illegal drug production and supply. The supply reduction process is started and driven by effective detection and monitoring (information) of illegal drug activity.¹³ As a function of the many varied and diverse resources that DOD brings to this requirement, it is detailed as the lead agency through an NCA directive to assist in the national effort.¹⁴ The Armed Forces, working in close cooperation with law enforcement agencies, are required to use all means authorized by the President and the Congress to halt the flow of illegal drugs into this country.¹⁵ In this, the DOD supports federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in their efforts to disrupt the transfer of illegal drugs into the United States.¹⁶

Although many functions are performed by the military, current DOD involvement is still quite limited in scope due to the Posse Comitatus [PC] Act.¹⁷ In 1997, this line was crossed when a Marine, acting in self-defense, killed an 18-year-old Texan he believed to be a drug trafficker while conducting a covert anti-drug patrol in U.S. territory near the Rio Grande.¹⁸ This type of detection operation was immediately suspended as government and DOD officials reviewed the rules of engagement [ROE], details of the case and adequacy of the policy. This is but one example that highlights the difficulty of military involvement in current counterdrug operations due to PC restraints.

In addition to formal DOD organizations, there are many other players involved in information operations with many bringing their own forms of communication to the fight.¹⁹ The Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) are required to provide the DOD regional Commanders-in-Chief CINCs with additional intelligence analysis.²⁰ The State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs works with supportive foreign governments and CINCs in establishing integrated counterdrug programs abroad. Through subsequent internal intelligence and support provided by many drug source nations, detection of illegal drug activity is enhanced.²¹ The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) routinely provides imagery intelligence [IMINT] to many supporting intelligence centers.²² Numerous other national and international IMINT and electronic intelligence [ELINT] sources are incorporated into current information operations in support of counterdrug supply reduction. Although not a complete listing, these organizations all provide valuable inputs in 'painting the information picture'.

With proper information, interdiction operations stand a fighting chance. The Coast Guard takes the lead in maritime interdiction operations and co-lead (with U.S. Customs Service) for air interdiction operations.²³ The Commandant of the Coast Guard is detailed as the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator.²⁴ The State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs provides ambassadors with country teams who work issues closest to the source(s). In fulfilling their duty, coalition building is critical, increasing interdiction coordination between foreign countries. CINCs assist in facilitating this activity. The Drug Enforcement Agency [DEA] fulfills many interdiction responsibilities inside our national borders. They actively staff many organizations such as Operation Alliance, Project North Star, the High Intensity Drug Traffic Areas [HIDTA] Program, Joint Task Force [JTF] 6, all three Joint Interagency Task Forces [JIATFs] -- West, East, and South, the Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center, and the Counterdrug Support Office.²⁵ As with information operations, this is not intended to be a complete listing; numerous other interdiction agencies from various government departments and agencies also share in various interdiction operations.

**Current C2 of Illegal Drug Supply Reduction Operations:
"Who's on First?"**

Detailed to this point, many players are involved in the information and interdiction effort. This expansive organization structure was created in the late 1980s when the nation's dedicated counterdrug effort began. Many were tasked to help solve - or, at least contain - the problem. Some of the questions asked at the time where:

- (1) Who would lobby and fund the effort and monitor these funds?
- (2) Who would brief Congress on the strategy and its future?
- (3) Who would consolidate intelligence and establish the C2 structure?

The answer to many of these questions came in the creation of the previously mentioned Office of National Drug Control Policy.²⁶ The Director of this office heads the drug control effort for the U.S. and coordinates all actions. The DOD, through functional plans implemented by its regional CINCs, provides additional direction for supply reduction in the counterdrug effort. This operational control structure has realized some success, but as GEN Wilhelm noted,

"While the progress toward a national objective of a democratic, peaceful, and prosperous hemisphere has been substantial, narcotics trafficking remains a major challenge in the region...the nations of the Hemisphere are recognizing narcotrafficking as a shared threat and a threat to national sovereignty. Regional law enforcement forces, which have the lead role, are progressing in the struggle against narcotrafficking within their borders. This is largely the result of successful engagement by various U.S. agencies with host nations." ²⁷

As much as this statement commends success, it also reveals the difficulty in commanding a unified effort across borders and agency lines. JTFs, JIATFs, the DEA, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, the Information Analysis Center, the Army National Guard, and many other organizations provide different forms of C2 to this effort.²⁸ The charts and figures at Annex A provide a more detailed look at the numerous agencies involved and the complex relationships to each other.

**Future Information and Interdiction Operations for
Illegal Drug Supply Reduction:
"The High Tech Train"**

With the current supply reduction operations reviewed, a look into future information and interdiction systems is now required. The 2010 Tempo of Operations will be much faster because of new technologies that will permeate our organizations. Information gathering in the future will be augmented significantly by space systems and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)²⁹; DOD will have tremendous access to these technical

advantages. NIMA will have continued or increased analysis and automated detection responsibilities.³⁰ JICs and other agencies will provide consolidated intelligence production support, including UAV downlinks and Web-based technology improvements.³¹ Combining information technology and nodal analysis techniques will allow for a responsive understanding of how enemy systems work, allowing precision guided munitions and systems to remove key nodes and, ultimately, taking enemy systems completely out of operation. Capitalizing on networkcentric warfare, commanders will develop speed of command; they will have self-synchronizing units that will provide more complete and accurate information at accelerated rates, coupled with the ability to direct action against targets at greater distances in order to neutralize or destroy them with precision strikes.³² For DOD and the Coast Guard, Joint Vision 2010 summarily describes this process, offering that the 2010 battlefield will operation on four tenets: (1) dominant maneuver; (2) precision engagement; (3) focused logistics; and (4) full-dimensional protection; collectively, these will be driven by the common understanding and connectivity to information dominance.³³

Each service component of the Department of Defense and the Coast Guard have developed (or are developing) doctrine and systems that support the JV2010 concept.³⁴ The Army has many programs working toward the next century and the future concept of operations.³⁵ This includes such initiatives as the joint combat identification program, continued employment testing of sophisticated UAVs, a suite of new integrated radars including TESAR, STARLOS, ARL, GBCS, GRCS, and Joint-STARS, an advanced data analysis system including ADDS and ASAS, and a group of command and control systems including GCCS, DIICOE, ABCS, AGCCS, ATCCS, MCS, ADDS,

ISYSCON.³⁶ The Navy, Air Force, Marines³⁷, and Coast Guard³⁸ are also moving in the same direction and in joint coordination with their technology initiatives. Other new systems identified for specific counterdrug operations are being developed by numerous other departments and agencies.³⁹ In supporting the development, production, and fielding of these specific technologies for the future, the National Drug Control Strategy calls for consistent funding over the next five years.^{40 41} The bottom line is that by 2010, funded technology *will* allow real-time information that is complete and focused. In complementing these advances, interdiction systems will be much quicker, more agile, precise, and collectively, more lethal.

**Assumptions about Future Drug Operations and Some Counter Arguments:
"If It's Not Broken, Why Fix It?" or "Hurry Up and Wait!"**

Before discussing some counter arguments or future C2 for illegal drug supply reduction operations, some general assumptions about future drug operations and our counterdrug response should be made. They include:

- (1) The illegal drug production will remain a rich business.
- (2) Drugs will still be used by many developing nations as a source of valuable income.
- (3) New drugs will be invented; however, the same process of source growth, processing, shipment, and distribution will apply.
- (4) From this, counterdrug supply and demand efforts will still be required.
- (5) The military will continue to be tasked to provide some support to this end.
- (6) Use of non-lethal weapons will increase.
- (7) The relative stability or increase in profits made by drug cartels will result in increased C2 offensive warfare⁴² and narcoterrorism against military/other agency efforts.
- (8) All organizations currently involved in CD operations will not have the ability to outfit their units with the latest technology.
- (9) Stopping the flow of drugs before it can be moved out into the broader expanse of the transit zone remains an effective strategy.⁴³
- (10) Targeting interdiction, based on solid intel data has the greatest chance of success.⁴⁴

Given these assumptions about the future drug operations, two counter arguments quickly come to mind. First, why can't we just take this new technology and lay it on top of the current C2 structure. In other words, "if it's not broken, why fix it?" Second, won't

changing things now make it more difficult to conduct current C2 because the technology is not here yet? It appears that changing things now is another case of "hurry up and wait."

In response to the first counter argument, it *is* questionable whether or not the current array of information systems and C2 structure are optimum for *today's* supply reduction operations. Many have challenged the current structure. Again GEN Wilhelm, in his testimony, provided a valuable insight on this topic,

"Two of the most significant challenges we face are: (1) obtaining sufficient detection, monitoring and tracking assets to cover all transit routes and (2) developing the common operating picture required to coordinate and orchestrate hemispheric counterdrug operations...the development of a common operating picture or system that will enable us to display simultaneously and in real time data developed by multiple collectors and operating agencies will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of both U.S. and multilateral counterdrug operations. Absent this capability, seams are created which traffickers exploit, and hand-offs of tracks of interest and prosecution of end game operations are significantly impeded. We have stressed to our neighbors that drugs are a hemispheric problem, which demands a hemispheric solution. Development of the common operating picture will remove one of the major obstacles to hemispheric cooperation." ⁴⁵

COL Larry M. Keeton also challenged the current command and control structure in his paper, "Collegial Czar or Combatant Commander - Who Should Lead America's War on Drugs?"

"Today, there are plenty of combatants (players) involved. This has lead to an interagency process that appears confusing, conflicting, and duplicative. In a Congressional visit to JIATF East, Rear Admiral Andrew A. Granuzo bluntly told the delegation that the primary obstacle in waging an effective counterdrug war was that no one was in charge. Follow on testimony by former Coast Guard Commandant, Admiral Paul Yost, former Drug Czar, William Bennett, and former DEA Administrator Robert C. Bonner concurred with the assessment." ⁴⁶

These are only two of a growing list who have voiced concern; both indicate that there is a better way to organize the *current* command and control structure for counterdrug operations. Although the five strategic goals submitted by the ONDCP are simple and mutually exhaustive, the planned execution of the strategy, especially the

supply reduction operation, is very complex, often redundant as a result of compartmentalization and, in some cases, seam-ridden. These shortcomings are the product of a problematic C2 arrangement in a large organization, resulting in assigned tasks to DOD and other agencies increasingly more difficult to accomplish.

In response to the second counter argument, when looking to the future, C2 *must* be addressed *first* - not technology. It does not appear that the ONDCP shares this same vision. Reviewing its 10-year plan, it states that “*existing* interagency organizations and initiatives will remain the building blocks for this effort (information and interdiction operations)”.⁴⁷ Many accounts of the failed use of technology fill military history books, especially since the Industrial Revolution. The ineffective use of the tank in open terrain and the machine-gun in trench warfare during World War I are two well-known examples of how new technology failed because the planned C2 and/or application of the technology was not sufficiently developed prior to employment. Force developers have learned that Revolutions/Evolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs/EMAs) must be adeptly integrated into operations for immediately effective and efficient results.⁴⁸ More than ever before in our nation's history, C2 will be a critical consideration. It will play a most important role and possibly be our forces 'center of gravity'. Command and Control Warfare (C2W) will accordingly permeate the battlefield.⁴⁹ C2 operations must be the planning and preparation focus *now* in order to insure execution success in the future.

**Recommended Future C2 for Illegal Drug Supply Reduction Operations:
"Who Will Drive that High Tech Train?"**

Revisiting the questions posed in the opening paragraph of this paper, 'Ten years from now, who should ultimately be in charge of the counterdrug operations for supply

and demand reduction?...Does the current C2 structure effectively address the future, preparing organizations and their leadership to do the counterdrug work for the United States that is required in the next century?⁵⁰ As I have argued, it is questionable that the *current* C2 structure for operational commanders conducting supply reduction operations is effective. I believe this structure will quickly fail in the same fight of the future. Four categories – ROE, missions, leadership, organizational structure, staffing, and planning - should be addressed *immediately* in re-configuring the command and control structure of the nation's counterdrug effort.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT – THE RISK

Is there a need to change the Posse Comitatus Act? Given the increased use of non-lethal weapons by DOD, serious consideration should be given to modifying this legislation for domestic counterdrug operations. The use of military force will likely be required in counterdrug operations to accommodate the mission speed generated by improved organic information and interdiction systems. The speed of drug delivery will only compound the requirement. As the number of agencies and departments participating in counterdrug operations in the next century becomes restricted due to costs, training, technology availability, or one of many other reasons, the military will be forced to increase its support to interdiction operations. Restrictive ROE will become a critical and limiting factor toward complete success of supply reduction operations. Uncommon ROE creates friction between friendly units; this must be reduced. When working side-by-side with other non-DOD agency members in interdiction missions, commanders will demand collective self-defense authority. The bottom line: it is worth

the *risk* of lifting the Posse Comitatus restriction for domestic counterdrug operations in order to defeat the stated national security threat created by the drug problem.

MISSIONS -- THE WAYS

Unity of effort will mark successful counterdrug operations in the future. A system that lacks a main effort and creates seams must be solved. In our supply reduction mission, all departments and agencies are collectively on the defense in that we are defending our homeland against illegal drug trafficking. In this, the main battle area must be in our own "sector". We do not own the terrain and, therefore, cannot completely affect the fight in out-of-sector missions (other countries) as we can in our own sector. Time, space, and forces are to our advantage near our homeland base. Applying this military approach, we should continue to do some work in attriting illegal drug trafficking in other nations but, until every drug source nation becomes as committed as we are about reducing drug trafficking (which is not likely), we should focus the majority of our supply reduction assets and dollars on our sovereign territory and close-in transit zones. This is where we set the rules and enforce the laws. The key territory is the collective points of embarkation around our littorals. This territory is where we should focus of our assets - DOD (Navy, Air Force, Army, and Marine), Coast Guard, Border Patrols, DEA, and other national agencies and departments. Lifting the Posse Comitatus restraint, complete assistance of DOD - information through interdiction -- could be brought to bear. Essentially, we should engage the "enemy" as far forward as possible in our sector where we can best mass as many effects as possible.

Seams must also be addressed. Part of the reason that seams are created is because the supply reduction requirement is often viewed as hemispheric, when, in fact, it is

global. It is difficult enough to keep track of drug movement (raw or processed products) between nations (both coalition and non-coalition members) within an AOR. By addressing drug supply from a global view, a more complete (and less confusing) fight can be fought. Not only between nations, drugs that move in and out of "CINCDoms" can also be quickly "lost in the shuffle." As an example, the 92 Degrees West Longitude Line is the boundary between SOUTHCOM and PACOM; drug movement across this line in the Pacific Ocean creates a major problem for responsible CINCs. An additional seam is created around our nation's coastal and land borders. As seen in Figure A-1, there is no single agency in charge of detecting and interdicting domestic or international drug traffickers. This must be fixed. At a minimum, one organization should take the lead for domestic information and interdiction operations. In support of this requirement, a CDJTF should be established, combining JTF 6 and JIATF-East as a core start point. The two remaining JIATFs should provide parts of their staff in support of this transition. This paper does not recommend dis-banning the JIATF South or West as they still need to provide CD supply reduction support to their regional CINCs. The goal of the consolidated should be to reduce redundancy and insure seamless coverage while maintaining some specialization in respective regional AORs. In doing this, sectors could more effectively established in assigning operational responsibility to detect, monitor, and engage illegal drug traffickers.

Regional counterdrug operations should become the primary responsibility of the CINCs because of their regional expertise and familiarity. Specialized assistance could be provided to them by the CDJTF based upon their collective and prioritized needs (handled similarly to assigning targets in an ATO). In this, planning would be

streamlined, as some of the interagency details currently handled by CINCs would be accomplished by the CDJTF, allowing them to focus on international/host-nation interagency coordination of information and interdiction operations. Domestically, the JTF 6 regional plan (Southeast, Southwest, and North Central Regions) is a good start toward achieving effective CONUS information and interdiction operations. The seams created between CINC's AORs and the national border would be reduced by having a single detection and monitoring planner/tasker for the continental U.S. Engagement (interdiction) responsibilities would be readily coordinated between organizations.

LEADERSHIP – THE WAYS

The Director, ONDCP, must have a respected status with other primary presidential cabinet members. Within his organization, a top-down review is needed. Only demand reduction and supply reduction should be provided separate leadership. Demand reduction should be commanded by an assistant director who has a direct coordination relationship with the United States Surgeon General's office. Supply reduction should focus on a global threat (not regional threats) and be commanded by an assistant director who has a direct coordination relationship with the U.S. Attorney General's office and the DOD. No other assistant directors are needed. The operational leadership of the CDJTF should fall under the CINACOM. This paper realizes the current debate over the CINACOM becoming the CINC CONUS in order to lead the growing homeland defense concern/effort. It is proposed that if (or when) this occurs, the CINC CONUS take command of the CDJTF. In order to insure that compatible C2 equipment is being tested, purchased, and integrated by all domestic agencies, this critical position must be filled by a CINC.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, STAFFING AND PLANNING – THE MEANS

As the speed of information increases, "more is not necessarily better". More players in the organization will create considerable delays in the decision-making and execution process. Of the fifty plus agencies and departments currently involved in counterdrug operations, only those that have the sophisticated technology and personnel capable of commanding and controlling the information and interdiction assets of the next century should remain involved. "Flatter" or "less-layered" organizations will be more efficient in accommodating the technological changes. Failure to flatten organizations and centralize information operations will create increased compartmentalization or stove-piping conditions. The staffs that supporting these counterdrug organizations should be outfitted with information operations specialist as a *primary* requirement. Recently, the Army instituted a new Officer Professional Management System (OPMS XII) which is re-aligning all officers into one of four career paths (Operations, Information Operations, Operations Support, or Institutional Support). Within the Information Operations path, a new specialty field track, FA 30 (Information Operations Officer), was created. The information operations officer integrates, coordinates, and synchronizes the employment of information technology, operations, and relevant intelligence in support of joint/component commanders.⁵¹ The other services have or are working toward this same end. These officer (and enlisted) personnel will be critical to the overall success of counterdrug operations. In addition, a full time Staff Judge Advocate officer must be on all counterdrug staffs to address ROE issues. As General Zinni commented when discussing the SJA in future operations,

"Looming in the horizon are potential operations against international crime or drug rings...the U.S. military may be the only organization with the capability to act effectively. Military lawyers will be directly involved in all of them."⁵²

Finally, a common planning system (modeled after the military solution) that incorporates planning cycles, estimates, and order production should be required in all departments and agencies.⁵³ The days of organizational uniqueness are quickly becoming problematic. Differences in institutional attitudes and operational approaches must be reduced in order to foster cooperative efforts and integration of multiagency capabilities.

. Some Final Words: Splashdown

Robust information operations through successful detection and monitoring of production, trafficking from production source to user, and infrastructure support for illegal drug supply activities must be sustained in order to achieve effective interdiction operations. This paper introduced many new technologies on the horizon of the 21st Century that will vastly improved information and interdiction operations. From these, future operational commanders will be provided an extensive set of options in order to rapidly attack or interdict key nodes of the drug cartels' operations. In order to accommodate the speed of illegal drug supply operations that will be realized in the new millennium, the current C2 structure should be *immediately* reviewed and subsequently changed. This paper recommends that the leadership, organizational staffing, missions, and rules of engagement are four critical areas that should receive primary re-structuring. There are no fast, easy solutions...but there are certain conditions that make the process more efficient and effective towards achieving goals as quick as possible. It is the hope of

the author that we will not miss the opportunity to capitalize on superior technology at the expense of a cumbersome and complex counterdrug C2 structure.

1 Barry McCaffrey, "International Drug Policy Challenges," Remarks, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y.: November 20, 1997, 3.

2 William Mendel and Murl Munger, "The Drug Threat: Getting Priorities Straight," Parameters, Summer 1997, 112.

3 Office of National Drug Control Policy, The National Drug Control Strategy, 1998 - A Ten Year Plan (Washington, D.C.: 1998), 12.

4 Barry McCaffrey, "International Drug Policy Challenges," Remarks, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y.: November 20, 1997, 2.

5 Congress, House, International Relations Committee, Remarks by Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, 103th Cong, 2nd sess, 6 June 1996, 2-5.

6 Cuba and many other Caribbean and Latin America countries in the transit zone participate in the trafficking of illegal drugs into the United States. In some cases, they also receive monetary payments for their permissiveness.

7 William Mendel and Murl Munger, "The Drug Threat: Getting Priorities Straight," Parameters, Summer 1997, 112.

8 Some estimates indicate that if one to five percent of the drugs get from source to user, a cartel scores a multi-million dollar profit.

9 Office of National Drug Control Policy, The National Drug Control Strategy, 1998 - A Ten Year Plan (Washington, D.C.: 1998), 3.

10 Barry McCaffrey, "International Drug Policy Challenges," Remarks, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y.: November 20, 1997, 3.

11 Office of National Drug Control Policy, The National Drug Control Strategy, 1998 - A Ten Year Plan (Washington, D.C.: 1998), 23.

12 Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Statement of General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command, 105th Cong, 2nd sess, 5 March 1998, 21.

13 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Counterdrug Operations (Joint Pub 3-07.4) (Washington, D.C.: February 17, 1998), IV-34.

14 Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the Americas (Washington, D.C.: September 1995), 25.

15 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America -- 1995 (Washington, D.C.: 1995), 9.

16 Specifically, the National Defense Authorization Act of 1989, amended in 1993, assigned four major counterdrug responsibilities to DOD: (1) Act as the single lead agency for detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the U.S.; (2) Integrate the command, control, communication, computer, and intelligence assets of the U.S. that are dedicated to interdicting the movement of illegal drugs into the U.S.; (3) Approve and fund state governors' plans for expanded use of the National Guard.; and (4) Detect, monitor, and communicate the movement of certain surface traffic that entered within 25 miles of the U.S. boundary. This DOD surveillance is to be conducted from within the U.S. territory. Additionally, other specified tasks include support to law enforcement agencies (federal, state, and local) and cooperative foreign governments through the use of information collected in coincident military operations, conduct of training exercises in drug interdiction areas, provisions of military equipment and facilities, training and advise to civil law enforcement officials, and maintenance/operation of special equipment. U.S. Joint

Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (Joint Pub 3-07) (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 1995), III-3.

17 The Posse Comitatus Act (Title 18 US Code Section 1385 states, "whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be ...[punished] (The Air Force was included in the law in 1956). The Navy and Marine Corps are not mentioned in the Act, but are held subject to it under DOD Regulation. The Coast Guard is exempt during peacetime as are the National Guard forces operating under the state authority of Article 32. James Whitehead, "Relooking Domestic Counterdrug Strategy: Is There an Increased Role for the Military?" Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1997, 6.

18 Andrew Stanley, "Military Counterdrug Patrols Along the Southwest Border: A Bridge Too Far," Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1998. 2-3.

19 No one single suite of communication systems supports the entire counterdrug operation. Instead, CD commo architectures draw from multiple agency systems that are integrated between commands and agencies to facilitate the intelligence, operations, and administration or logistics requirements of the users U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Counterdrug Operations (Joint Pub 3-07.4) (Washington, D.C.: February 17, 1998), IV-12-IV-13.

20 R.M. LeVitre, "JICs 'R' Us: Intelligence Support to Joint Warfighting," Remarks, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: January 6, 1999.

21 Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Statement of General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command, 105th Cong, 2nd sess, 5 March 1998, 17.

22 Joint Military Operations Department, Intelligence/C4ISR and the Operational Commander (Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 1998), 7.

23 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Counterdrug Operations (Joint Pub 3-07.4) (Washington, D.C.: February 17, 1998), III-23.

24 William Mendel and Murl Munger, Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army War College, 1997), 31.

25 Ibid, 38-54.

26 See Page 1.

27 Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Statement of General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command, 105th Cong, 2nd sess, 5 March 1998, 16-17.

28 William Mendel and Murl Munger, "The Drug Threat: Getting Priorities Straight," Parameters, Summer, 1997, 115-120.

29 Jeffery Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, Third Edition (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), 161.

30 Douglas Eyes, "The National Imagery and Mapping Agency: Harnessing Geographic and Imagery Intelligence in Support of the 21st Century Joint Force Commander," Unpublished Research Paper, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 1997, 6-11.

31 R.M. LeVitre, "JICs 'R' Us: Intelligence Support to Joint Warfighting," Remarks, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: January 6, 1999.

32 Arthur Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare -- Its Origin and Future," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1998 (Vol.124, No. 1/1, 139), 32.

33 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010. (Washington, D.C.: 1996), 26.

34 DOD will integrate mid and long-term CD requirements into the established DOD process. Although maximum interoperability is desired, it might not be possible. Planning for alternate communication methods is essential. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Counterdrug Operations (Joint Pub 3-07.4) (Washington, D.C.: February 17, 1998), IV-34.

35 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Vision 2010 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996), 1.

36 These platforms and systems, listed here only by acronyms, are just a few of the many that are being brought into the inventory. They are listed as acronyms not to confuse the reader but, rather, to quickly show the vast number of systems on the horizon. Association of the United States Army, Army -- 1997-98 Green Book (Arlington, VA.: 1998), 233-302.

37 Of special note is the "Osprey", a tiltrotor aircraft that combines the speed of an aircraft with the flexibility of a helicopter. The CV-22 and MV-22B are Air Force and Marine models, respectively. These aircraft have tremendous survivability through combining speed, acoustic suppression, thermal dampening and integrated threat analysis, planning, and countermeasure systems. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc, V-22...The Future Is Here! (Philadelphia, PA.: 1997), 11-19.

38 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard 2020 (Washington, D.C.: 1998), 5.

39 Office of National Drug Control Policy, A Counterdrug Research and Development Blueprint Update (Washington, D.C.: 1995), iii.

40 \$16.7 billion are projected in 2000 for meeting the drug control challenges in the United States (\$ 16.7 billion in 2001; \$16.81 billion in 2002, and \$17.18 billion in 2003). Office of National Drug Control Policy, The National Drug Control Strategy, 1998: Budget Summary (Washington, D.C.: 1998), 9.

41 The national budget continues to fund the supply reduction requirements of the drug control strategy. \$1.53 billion were spent in 1998 on Goal 4. This accounts for 9.5 percent of the total \$15.98 billion allocated to the National Drug Control Strategy for that year. \$1.66 billion are planned for 1999 or 9.7 percent of the \$17.07 billion allocated to Goal 4 for that year. \$2.68 billion were provided in 1998 toward Goal 5. This accounts for 16.8 percent of that year's National Drug Control Strategy budget. \$2.93 billion are planned for 1999 or 17.2 percent of the \$17.07 billion allocated to Goal 5 for that year. On average, forty percent of each year's budget is allocated toward Goal 2, which accommodates both supply and demand reduction controls. Overall, approximately half of the nation's drug control budget is spent on supply reduction; the other half is spent on demand reduction.

42 The technologies and tools available to these drug suppliers will certainly improve. Unfortunately, we are already seeing some transformation to this different operating environment for drug cartels through faster and more ingenious methods of money laundering using electronic methods (primarily the Internet) and vastly improved transit technologies (such as versatile, high-speed craft and submarines).

43 Office of National Drug Control Policy, Reducing Drug Abuse in America (Washington, D.C.: October 1997), Slide 94.

44 Office of National Drug Control Policy, Reducing Drug Abuse in America (Washington, D.C.: October 1997), Slide 92.

45 Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Statement of General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command, 105th Cong, 2nd sess, 5 March 1998, 21-22.

46 Larry Keeton, "Collegial Czar or Combatant Commander - Who Should Lead America's War on Drugs?" Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1998, 16-17.

47 Office of National Drug Control Policy, The National Drug Control Strategy, 1998 - A Ten Year Plan (Washington, D.C.: 1998), 42.

48 Technological gaps between the U.S. and its allies (interagency organizations should be included here) may develop

because of the American lead in exploitation of the RMA. Divisions of labor, technological "bridges" between forces at diverse technological levels, the selective sharing of certain technologies (e.g., command, control, and communications), and close defense cooperation (to include industrial collaboration) among allies and between allies and the U.S. may represent viable approaches to help minimize the negative impact of technological disparities. The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Preparing Now -- Alternative Paths to Military Capabilities for an Uncertain Future (Washington, D.C.: February 1998), 21.

49 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, D.C.: 1996), 16.

50 See Page 1 for complete list of questions.

51 Headquarters, Department of the Army, OPMS XII: Developing an Officer Corps for the 21st Century (TAB 3 on Primary Factors) (Washington, D.C.: November 1997), Slide 14.

52 Anthony Zinni, "The SJA in Future Operations," Marine Corps Gazette, February 1996, 17.

53 William Mendel and David Bradford, Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1995), 83.

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ANNEX A

Current C2 of Supply Reduction Operations

Figure A-1. Lead and Primary Agencies
from U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations – Vol II
(Joint Pub 3-08) Washington, D.C.: October 9, 1996. Page E-7.

Federal Lead/Primary Agencies and Their Responsibilities	
LEAD/PRIMARY AGENCIES	RESPONSIBILITIES
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD)	DETECTION AND MONITORING OF AERIAL AND MARITIME TRANSIT OF ILLEGAL DRUGS IN SUPPORT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION (DEA)	ENFORCING LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON DRUGS & CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Investigating major interstate and international drug law violators - Enforcing regulations on legal manufacture & distribution of controlled substances - Participates in drug intelligence-sharing with other national agencies - Coordinating DEA and international counterparts' efforts
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI)	INVESTIGATING VIOLATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAWS - (concurrent with DEA) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Targeting major multi-jurisdictional trafficking organizations - Goal is dismantling trafficking networks
US ATTORNEYS	PROSECUTING CRIMINALS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Prosecuting violations of federal laws concerning: controlled substances, - Overseeing OCDEF's activities
US BORDER PATROL	"PRIMARY AGENCY" - LAND INTERDICTION BETWEEN US PORTS OF ENTRY (POEs)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE (DOS) - INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS	COORDINATING US INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY REDUCTION STRATEGIES
US CUSTOMS SERVICE	LEAD - INTERDICTION AT LAND AND SEA US POEs (with US Border Patrol as "Primary Agency" between POEs and US TERRITORIAL WATERS CO-LEAD (with Coast Guard) - AIR INTERDICTION
US COAST GUARD	LEAD - MARITIME INTERDICTION CO-LEAD (with Customs Service) - AIR INTERDICTION

Figure A-2. Counterdrug Organizations
 from U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations – Vol II
 (Joint Pub 3-08) Washington, D.C.: October 9, 1996. Page E-5.

Counterdrug Organizations							
ORGANIZATIONS	CRIMINAL JUSTICE	DRUG TREATMENT	EDUC; CMTY ACTION: WORKPLACE	INTERNATL INITIATIVES	DRUG INTERDICTIONS	RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT	INTEL & INFO MGT
FEDERAL - EXEC OFC PRES - NSC	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
EXEC OFC PRES - ONDCP	P	P	P	M	S	S	S
CIA	O	O	O	P	O	M	M
DOD	A	A	S	A	L(3) & M(3)	S	S(1), M(3)
DOJ-DEA	L(1),M(2)	O	A	M	M	O	L
- FBI	L(1),M(2)	O	A	S	S	O	M
- INS	S	O	A	A	S	S	A
- INS-US BORDER PATROL	S	O	A	A	M(4)	O	A
- US ATTORNEY	L(2),M(1)	O	A	L(2)	S	O	M
- US MARSHALS	S	O	A	S	S	O	A
- BUREAU OF PRISONS	S	A	A	O	O	O	A
- INTERPOL - (US)	S	O	A	M	S	O	S
DOS - INL	A	O	A	L	A	O	A
- USAID	O	A	A	M	O	O	O
- COUNTRY TEAMS	A	O	A	M	S	O	S
- USIA	O	O	S	S	O	O	O
TREAS - CUSTOMS SERVICE	M	O	A	S	L(4) & (5)*	O	M
- ATF	S	O	A	A	S	O	A
- IRS	S	O	A	A	S	O	A
- SECRET SERVICE	S	O	A	A	A	O	A
DOT - COAST GUARD	A	O	A	S	L(4) & (5)	S	M
- FAA	S	O	A	A	S	O	A
AGRIC - US FOREST SERVICE	A	O	A	O	S	O	A
INTERIOR - BIA (INDIAN AFF)	O	O	A	O	A	O	A
- BLM (LAND MGT)	O	O	A	O	A	O	A
- NPS (PARK SVC)	A	O	A	O	S	O	A
EDUCATION DEPT	A	M	M	O	O	S	A
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES	O	L	M	A	O	M	A
COMPOSITE/REGINTL - HIDTAs	M	O	A	S	M	O	S
- OCEDETs	M(1) & (2)	O	A	L(2)	A	O	M(2)
- OP ALLIANCE	M(1)	O	A	M	M	O	S
- PROJ NORTH STAR	M(1)	O	A	M	M	O	S
- OPBAT	M(1)	O	A	M	M	O	S
- EPIC	S	O	A	S	M	O	M
STATE/LOCAL - NG (STATE)	S	O	A	O	M	O	S
- DEA SL TASK FORCES	M(1) & (2)	O	A	S	M	O	S

*Maritime lead from the territorial sea and shoreward

Figure A-3. Counterdrug Organizations (continued)
from U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations – Vol II
(Joint Pub 3-08) Washington, D.C.: October 9, 1996. Page E-6.

ORGANIZATIONS	CRIMINAL JUSTICE	DRUG TREATMENT	EDUC; CMTY ACTION; WORKPLACE	INTERNATL INITIATIVES	DRUG INTERDICTIONS	RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT	INTEL & INFO MGT
- PROJ NORTH STAR	M(1)	o	A	M	M	o	S
- OPBAT	M(1)	o	A	M	M	o	S
- EPIC	S	o	A	S	M	o	M
STATE/LOCAL - NG (STATE)	S	o	A	o	M	o	S
- DEA S/L TASK FORCES	M(1) & (2)	o	A	S	M	o	S

*Maritime lead from the territorial sea and shoreward

FIGURE CODES EXPLANATION

A Ancillary Role
L Lead Agency and Major Responsibilities
L(1) Lead Agency - Investigations
L(2) Lead Agency - Prosecutions
L(3) Lead Agency - Detection and Monitoring
L(4) Shared Lead Agency - Air Interdiction
L(5) Lead Agency - Maritime Interdiction

FIGURE CODES EXPLANATION

L(6) Lead Agency - Land Interdiction
M Major Responsibilities
M(1) Major Responsibilities - Investigations
M(2) Major Responsibilities - Prosecutions
M(3) Major Responsibilities - C3
M(4) Primary Agency - Border Interdiction
P Policy Guidance
S Significant Support Role
S(1) Significant Role - Intelligence

ACRONYM EXPLANATION

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
BIA Bureau of Indian Affairs
BLM Bureau of Land Management
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
DOD Department of Defense
DOJ Department of Justice
DOS Department of State
DOT Department of Transportation
EPIC El Paso Intelligence Center
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
HIDTAs High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas
INL International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
INS Immigration and Naturalization Service

ACRONYM EXPLANATION

IRS Internal Revenue Service
NG National Guard
NPS National Park Service
NSC National Security Council
OCDETF Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force
ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy
OP Operation
OPBAT Operation Bahamas, the Turks, and Caicos Islands
US United States
USAID US Agency for International Development
USIA US Information Agency

Figure A-4. The Various Local, State, and Federal Drug Law Enforcement Agencies and Task Forces
 from William Mendel and Murl Munger, Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army War College, 1997, page 22.




Figure A-5. The Office of National Drug Control Policy
 from William Mendel and Murl Munger, Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat, Fort
 Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army War College, 1997, page 23.

